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1. INTRODUCTION 
n everyday discourse, we talk about purposes and functions in quite dif-
ferent contexts: for instance, we refer to the functions of social institu-
tions as well as to those of artefacts and of biological entities. The problem 
to be discussed here is whether such notions as purpose and function can 
be conceived independently of the domains and regional ontologies to 
which they are applied. Or whether the different scopes within which such 
notions perform an explicative role (sometimes, an identifying task with 
respect to certain objects) entail different ways of thinking about the being-
for they express. We can claim of a pen, for instance, that its function is to 
make writing possible; that a local police officer’s function is to keep ur-
ban traffic under control; and that the heart’s function is to pump blood, 
thus producing sufficient pressure to allow for the circulation of the blood. 
The question is: Are we referring to a unique notion of function in the three 
aforementioned situations, since in each case the being-for of these differ-
ent entities is at issue? or: does the specificity of the fields and of the onto-
logical regions to which we are referring entail a difference in our under-
standing of the aim or function of these different objects, and therefore, of 
the being-for pertaining to each of them? 
2. THE QUESTION IN THE CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE 
ON FUNCTIONS 
Most of those who debate functions nowadays seem to agree that the no-
tion of function is a univocal one, applicable to different areas, albeit via 
quite different approaches. According to this position, the logical structure 
of function does not depend on its spheres of application. On the one hand, 
it is quite obvious that, when we talk of such artefacts as the pen, of such 
social roles as that of the local police officer, or of such biological entities 
as the heart, we are speaking of different objects. On the other hand, these 
I 
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objects would share a common functional characterization, with respect to 
which (and obviously, only from this viewpoint) they appear as entities 
possessing the same modality of being: the pen, the local police officer, 
and the heart, are recognized as such because they are all identified as be-
ing a being-for in the first place, and this is something determined with re-
spect to the purpose of its action, or the function it performs. 
In this sense, taking an aetiological approach to the issue of function—
one that aims to provide a causal explanation of function as a past effect 
selected by the historical, evolutionary process—L. Wright proposes a uni-
tary definition of function, holding both for natural beings and for artefacts 
(Wright 1973). According to Wright, this does not mean that there are no 
differences between a natural being and an artefact; rather his proposed no-
tion of function is not affected by the features of the different classes of en-
tities to which it is ascribed. 
Within this approach, the definition R.G. Millikan gives of proper func-
tion is that in order for an object A to have a function F as its proper func-
tion, it is necessary that: (1) A be originated as a reproduction (a copy, or a 
copy of a copy, etc.) of preceding items which, partly because of their pos-
sessing the properties which are transmitted, have performed function F in 
the past; and (2) A exists because (a historical and causal ‘because’) such 
items have performed F (Millikan 1984, 1989). Such a definition refers in-
distinctively to social and biological entities as well as to artefacts. 
The same can be observed of the dispositional perspective à la Cummins, 
an approach typically contrasted with the aetiological one. For this model to 
ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a capacity to it which is singled 
out by its role in an analysis of some capacity of the system which contains 
that thing. The aetiological approach aims to explain the presence of the 
function on the basis of the causal history of the item to which it is ascribed. 
In this case, on the contrary, the focus is on the effects of the functionally 
characterized item on the overall action of the system (Cummins 1975). 
Within Cummins’ treatment functional ascription always takes place with 
respect to a system with no further characterization. Despite Cummins’ radi-
cal departure from the aetiological approach, his treatment also dismisses, 
somehow a priori, the artefactual, social or biological constitution of the re-
levant system. One may even claim that Cummins’ model appears to be less 
problematic than the one Wright and Millikan propose, where reference to 
the selective history spells trouble—intuitively at least—in the artefact case. 
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D. Dennett’s notion that function (whether of an artefact, or of an organ-
ism) entails a ‘design stance’ is, at least for the aspects discussed here, 
even more radical. This concept involves the idea that functionally charac-
terized objects have been conceived and planned. Evidently, such a refer-
ence to design does not necessarily involve intentionality, for according to 
Dennett, in the case of natural beings we are facing an unintentional design 
tracable to the evolutionary forces of nature (Dennett 1996). Interestingly, 
apart from the fact that in the case of artefacts the agent operates purpose-
fully whereas natural design is unintentional, the explanation underpinning 
this understanding of both the way of being of artefacts, and the natural 
way of being, seem to be the same.  
A. Plantinga’s approach does not distinguish the notion of function ac-
cording to the different domains to which it is applied, but also, in some 
sense, it bases its argumentative force precisely on linking the characteris-
tic functions of artefacts to those of natural beings. According to Plantinga, 
the existence of functions in nature is proof of the existence of an intelli-
gent designer: since only a designer could justify the presence of such 
functions, for the artefact case shows that these are products or conse-
quences of intentions, therefore of a designer’s projects. Just as a function-
ally characterized artefact corresponds to a design plan, so too are organ-
isms and their parts the products of specific design, insofar as they are 
functionally characterized. Therefore it is possible to attribute proper func-
tions to natural beings, only if they perform such functions by conforming 
to how they have been planned by the designer (Plantinga 1993).  
Plantinga’s position may be simplified as follows:  
 
1. If one grants that actually there are proper functions of natural beings 
2. then, proper functions exist only as the products of intentional activ-
ity—therefore, of a designer,  
3. it is necessary to admit, as for the functions of an artefact, some form 
of intelligence behind natural functions, to account for their existence.  
 
Now, most positions within the current debate on functions follow a natu-
ralistic stance by trying to account for functions and the teleological fea-
tures they entail without referring to an intentional model necessarily lead-
ing to such a position as the one advocated by Plantinga. However, the no-
tion of function at issue in the different naturalistic explanations—be it the 
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aetiological position of Wright, Millikan or K. Neander, or Dennett’s de-
sign stance and P. Kitcher’s design theory for functions (also see Kitcher 
1993)—is indifferently applied to both the domain of artefacts and biologi-
cal entities in all cases.1 
                                                
1  For a classification of the positions within the contemporary debate on teleology 
and functions performed by dividing them into extra-naturalistic, naturalistic and 
quasi-naturalistic categories, see Perlman 2004. He subdivides the so-called non-
naturalistic position into two versions or subclasses: the metaphysical non-
naturalism and the religious non-naturalism. In the first case—which originates 
from a platonic model—everything aims at perfection: a transcendent idea with 
respect to that thing, and the model of the thing itself. In the second case, the ex-
istence of a purpose in nature is not assumed as something requiring explanation; 
rather as a sort of datum which should lead to the admission of a supreme being 
as the origin of purposes and functions in nature. In opposition to these non-
naturalistic conceptions (undoubtedly a minority, and disregarded by some), 
Perlman shows how most contemporary theories are characterized by a naturalis-
tic approach. This kind of approach is determinable by the attempt to explain the 
employment of such notions as purpose and function with no appeal to principles 
transcending nature. However, within this kind of approach we find very differ-
ent positions. In particular, it is possible to distinguish: 1) a reductionist ten-
dency, holding that it is possible to translate teleological speech into non-
teleological speech without losing any information produced in the former; 2) a 
radicalization of the reductive naturalism Perlman calls eliminativism, which 
considers teleology not only as being reducible to any mechanisms, but as simply 
an illusion; 3) a non-reductionist tendency which tries to save the possibility of 
teleological speech by claiming that it will be never completely translatable into 
a non-teleological speech involving reference to neither transcendent metaphysi-
cal principles, nor alternative models of causality. Between non-naturalistic and 
naturalistic positions Perlman inserts an approach he calls quasi-Naturalistic, 
which he identifies with the Aristotelian theory of biological functions and with 
the so-called emergentist positions. According to this approach, even if functions 
are somehow reducible to the physical properties of an object, this does not 
mean, as reductionists claim, that functions are not real but ‘emergent’ properties 
supervening the relations between the physical properties of the object. Actually, 
calling these positions ‘quasi-naturalistic’ appears to be a means of underlining 
the ambiguity that could be their main feature. Perhaps one had better not con-
sider these positions as naturalistic at all, but in a strong antireductionist sense; 
i.e., as positions which try to conceptualize functions as real properties without 
considering them as physical properties, and without making reference to a tran-
scendent entity to justify their presence as real. For other attempts to provide tax-
onomies in the modern debate on functions see Wouters 2005. 
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3. A COMMON PRESUPPOSITION OF THE DIFFERENT POSITIONS? 
Now, such reliance on a unique notion of function for both the artefactual 
and natural case is apparently based on the precise assumption that: func-
tions are the products of an activity which is extrinsic with respect to the 
object to which it is ascribed. In other words, functions refer to something 
external to the functionally characterized entity—be it the activity of an in-
tentional agent, or selective history, or the unintentional design of the evo-
lutionary forces of nature. 
To put it another way, both the aetiological and the design stance expla-
nation attribute to history, and to the design produced by selective proc-
esses, the same role given to intention in the explanation of purposeful ac-
tions. Lacking such an antecedent element, any discourse on purposes and 
functions faces the classical problems of backward causation, with some-
thing coming later (the goal) causing something coming earlier (the func-
tionally characterized object). 
4. THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE ARTEFACT MODEL 
It is well known that reference to intention, taken as the causal element in 
the form of the mental anticipation of the goal, apparently solves the prob-
lems in attributing purposes, for instance, to artefacts. Therefore it may be 
claimed that what allows us to say that the ontological status of the pen is 
linked to its function is the fact that if we identify a pen as such via its 
function, then the pen is taken to have been produced in order to achieve a 
certain goal; we find in the pen an intention (preceding the object) which is 
not in the object as such, but has its place in the designer and producer of 
the object, and in those who recognize in it the designer’s intention. 
Also in the case of natural entities, there are three ways to avoid back-
ward causation problems: first, one may think of them as related to a de-
signer capable of accounting for their functional characterization. Other-
wise, if one wants to avoid such a line, one may find  an antecedent ele-
ment to causally explain the functional characterization of the entity. 
Finally, one may discard the problem by bringing functional ascription 
back to the mere analysis performed by a subject on a certain system. 
The aforementioned naturalistic explanations of function attempt to 
conceive natural being without admitting an intentional agent external to 
nature as the causal factor capable of accounting for the function itself. The 
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mandatory antecedent is radically different, in that it transcends neither the 
naturalistic element, the past history of an entity, nor the design determined 
by the selective processes. However, it has the same causal role of inten-
tion in the explanation of the function of artefacts or goal-oriented actions. 
In this sense, one may claim that naturalistic explanations of functions 
share a feature with supernaturalistic ones, concerning the fundamental 
structure of the notion of function:  the idea that organic functions can be 
explained the same way as artefactual ones: by resorting to an external 
causal factor. 
Both the aforementioned naturalistic readings, and Plantinga’s ‘non-
naturalistic’ position (due to its strong theological and metaphysical com-
mitment) share what has been called an artefact model of nature (Lewens 
2004, 2) which takes nature to be the product of either an intentionally ori-
ented designer, or something acting as a designer, albeit unintentionally. 
Despite the claims of Plantinga (and those philosophers and theologians 
who exploit the teleological argument for the existence of God as an ex-
planation of world regularities), the artefact model of nature can be taken 
as a mere methodological attitude—therefore, as a heuristic strategy. This 
way, one could avoid the classical charges of anthropomorphism advanced, 
for instance, by Spinoza and Hume, against such a way of understanding 
nature. The assumption of the artefactual model—that is, of the explana-
tory structure underlying the hermeneutics of artefacts—as the methodo-
logical model of natural inquiry, however, is not neutral with respect to the 
way of being of nature itself, unless we believe that such a model merely 
illuminates a construction of the interpreting subject, with no link to the ac-
tuality of what is interpreted. Therefore, either we think that assuming the 
hermeneutics of artefacts as the paradigmatic way to understand nature 
somehow reflects the way of being of nature itself (which nevertheless en-
tails that nature is actually taken as resulting from a productive or construc-
tive process analogous to the one underlying the production of a technical 
item); or, if we want to avoid reaching such a conclusion, we have to admit 
that the results conveyed by the assumption of such a model are nothing 
but mere subjective constructions, having nothing to do with the way of 
being of the reality one is investigating. 
Consequently one of the implicit difficulties in indistinctly assuming a 
unique notion of function both for artefacts and for biological entities, e-
merges at this level: if, on the one hand, the being-for of artefacts appears 
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to be reducible to an intentional element constituting their causal features, 
on the other hand, the being-for of biological entities is explained by find-
ing in them either an intention (which has to be a transcendent intelli-
gence’s, so that the argument is moved to a level which entails a peculiar 
theological and metaphysical commitment), or something that should act as 
an intention, without being intention. 
5.  IN DEFENCE OF A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATURAL 
TELEOLOGY AND THE TELEOLOGY OF ARTEFACTS 
The characteristic being-for of artefacts, contrary to mainstream theories, is 
based upon a structure which is irreducible to that underlying the being-for 
of the organs of living beings. Our primary conviction is that only by clari-
fying such a difference can one avoid the assimilation of the way of being 
of living beings to that of artefacts (as happens when artefacts are thought 
of as peculiar, as Plantinga’s divine artefacts are for example), and also the 
consequences of a framework within which living beings are viewed meta-
phorically as if they were artefacts, in order to escape from the radical con-
sequences of a strongly theological and metaphysical commitment, despite 
the awareness that they cannot be such in the same sense as those whose 
origin is recognized in intentions. 
In order to conceptualize the difference between the artefactual notion 
of function and one appropriate for the way of being of living beings, we 
shall rely on the distinction between internal and external purposiveness 
Kant proposes in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. This recovery 
will clarify some inherent tensions within the Kantian transcendental fra-
mework, and these tensions will assume paradigmatic value with respect to 
the issue of thinking about the functions and purposes of artefacts and liv-
ing beings differently. As we shall try to show, on the one hand the Kant-
ian distinction between internal and external purposiveness allows for the 
adoption of two different models of functional attribution with respect to 
artefacts and living beings; on the other hand, the purely regulative value 
Kant assigns to purposiveness with respect to the inquiry into the natural 
world seems to be justified on the basis of a teleological model related to 
artefacts as the unique and real model within which purposiveness reveals 
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some proper features of the mode of being of the functionally characterized 
object.2 
In this sense, we will try to establish the feasibility of overcoming the 
transcendental perspective’s tendency to assign a merely regulative role to 
natural purposiveness, in order to begin to recognize the constitutive role 
of purposiveness in nature, without having to justify it via supernatural en-
tities. 
6. ORGAN AND INSTRUMENT 
Let us return to the artefact model of nature or, more precisely, to the fact 
that when we talk of organisms, and of organic parts from the viewpoint of 
the whole they constitute, avoiding what Lewens calls the phenomenon of 
artefact talk in biology seems impossible. In many respects the idea of an 
artefact model of nature, or of an artefact model in the consideration of the 
living world, seems to be entrenched in ordinary language. Actually when 
we talk of living beings, we take them to be organisms, that is, organized 
structures unifying a multiplicity of organs or instruments whose task con-
sists in performing determinate functions. 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explains the concept of 
organ by reference to that of instrument. Since for Kant an organism is an 
organized and self-organizing being, where “each part is conceived as it 
exists only through all the others” and “for the sake of the others and on 
account of the whole”. Therefore each part of an organism must be consid-
ered as an instrument (Werkzeug) “that produces the other parts (conse-
quently each produces the others reciprocally)” [Critique of the Power of 
Judgment (hereafter: CPJ) 373-374 (245)].3 
                                                
2  Within our discourse, which aims to distinguish the artefactual way of being 
from that of biological entities, we shall not take into account such artefacts as 
artworks since their ontological status is not reducible to a general ontology of 
artefacts; on the contrary, it should be taken—again, following Kant—as lying on 
the boundary between the ontology of artefacts and that of living beings. 
3  Citations from the Critique of the Power of Judgment (‘CPJ’) will be located by 
page number as in volume V of the so-called Akademie edition, Kants gesam-
melte Schriften, edited by the Königlichen Preussischen [now Deutschen] 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-). Citations from 
the so-called ‘First Introduction’ to the Critique of the Power of Judgment (‘FI’) 
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According to Kant, an organ is a highly peculiar tool. Unlike the in-
struments mentioned within the artefactual approach, organs do not refer to 
something external as the source of their subsisting: they are organs, pre-
cisely because they produce themselves and the other parts that also per-
form an instrumental function within the living organism—and here ‘or-
ganism’ cannot mean anything of organs. Kant underlines this peculiarity 
when he claims that the self-productive capacity of the organism’s organ 
“cannot be the case in any instrument of art” [CPJ, 373-374 (245)]. This 
claim is extremely significant within the general Kantian strategy. If one 
affirms that an organism is nothing but a bunch of instruments, Kant’s aim 
to identify the features that distinguish the way of being of organisms from 
that of mechanisms, and make it irreducible to the way of being of artefacts 
would be obscured. However (and this is one of the many tensions charac-
terizing the Kantian point of view), the very notion of the organ explained 
as an instrument, like the characterization of natural beings as ‘products of 
nature’, seem to point (even beyond Kant’s intentions) to the sphere of 
man’s produce or technical products, the world of artefacta, that is, pre-
cisely to the domain Kant invokes by distinction to living organisms. 
Therefore when we try to grasp the notion of organism in its constitu-
tive elements, it refers us to words, concepts, and to a categorical appara-
tus, all of which seem to obtain their meaning from the typical conceptu-
alization of the world of artefacts. Consequently this seems to produce the 
phenomenon of artefact talk in biology, which in turn appears to presup-
pose an implicit (if not unconscious) assumption of an explanatory model 
entailing reference to intentions, or to something like intentions.4 In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                      
will be located by volume (XX) and page number from the Akademie edition. Ci-
tation from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences (MFNS) will be lo-
cated by volume (IV) and page number from the Akademie edition. The transla-
tions are taken from Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews’ edition of the Critique of the 
Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and the 
Gary Hatfield, Michael Friedman, Henry Allison and Peter Heath edition (Theo-
retical Philosophy after 1781, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
The pagination of translated editions will be bracketed. 
4  The idea of an unconscious metaphysics underlying the development of natural 
sciences is also Kantian. In Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences Kant 
makes the well-known claim that each natural science necessarily entails a meta-
physics of nature. Now, whereas natural science is the inquiry into an object of 
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instruments are something useful for; their general ontological determina-
tion consists in their being something for. Precisely because they obtain 
their meaning from their being something for and therefore from their be-
ing useful in order to, instruments appear to share the status of technical 
products: something made (thought, designed or built) for something else. 
Products are objects deriving from a process of production, that is, not only 
from a building process, but also from a level determining (a design) since 
what the product is made for is prior to the cause and is its reason for being 
or existence. Products are produced for, designed and built in order to. 
7. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORGAN AND INSTRUMENT 
Taking organs to be instruments seems to lead us to derive a series of con-
sequences from the concept of organ, ones which are apparently difficult to 
preserve, and this in turn leads us to the artefactual perspective. For this 
reason we should consider whether we are positively allowed to say that 
the organs of an organism are not instruments, and in what sense the being-
for underlying the structure of instruments as technical products can be dis-
tinguished from the being-for of the organs of an organism. A possible 
strategy for distinguishing these two forms of being-for is to identify what 
the being-for of the organ is directed to, and the aims of the being-for of 
the instrument.5 
                                                                                                                                                      
experience within nature, the metaphysics of nature has to do with the notion of 
nature in general—that is, with the conditions and presuppositions by means of 
which natural sciences are capable of studying nature itself as something given. 
Natural science usually rejects the idea that its inquiry may have metaphysical 
by-products; but according to Kant this does not mean that it can dispense with 
metaphysics. Rather, it means that science exploits metaphysics unconsciously: 
“all natural philosophers, […], made use of metaphysical principles (albeit un-
consciously), even if they they themselves solemnly guarded against all claims of 
metaphysics upon their science” [MFNS, 472 (187)]. 
5  In this section, we shall follow Martin Heidegger, who took up the issue in a 
course entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, 
Solitude, given in 1929-30. It is devoted largely to the attempt to unfold the fun-
damental ontological differences between the organic, inorganic, and human, via 
analysis of the different ways in which these three modes of being relate to the 
world. Hence it follows the discussion of the three famous Heideggerian theses: 
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The first feature to emerge from such a comparison is that: although the 
being-for of the organ and the instrument are both translatable into an ac-
tivity oriented towards some entity, it is the kind of relation towards such 
an entity that makes the difference. If, on the one hand, the instrument ap-
pears to be self-subsistent, not being a part of what makes use of it, on the 
other hand, the organ of the organism seems to be incapable of self-
subsistence, being tied to the organism of which it is a part. Unlike instru-
ments, organs are always included in the subject to which their being-for is 
directed, so much so that beyond such relations the organ is no longer it-
self. That a given organ can be transplanted from one organism to another 
is irrelevant with respect to the connotation of organs as things which, 
unlike instruments, are what they are only by virtue of being included in 
what uses them. Even in transplants, it is the incorporation itself that 
makes a transplanted object an organ. An organ is what it is only insofar as 
it remains within the organic structure; outside of the organized structure 
the object, which finds its characterization in the specific being-for affect-
ing it, is no longer an organ, because it lacks the being-for which individu-
ates it as a particular organ. 
8. CAPACITY AND BEING READY-MADE 
Heidegger attempts to positively characterize the difference between the 
aims of the being-for of the organ and that of the instrument, by using two 
words that underline, both the impossibility of an organ subsisting outside 
of the structure constituting its own condition of possibility, and, the possi-
bility of the instrument subsisting independently of its support. Accord-
ingly, whereas the being-for of instruments is made explicit in what can be 
defined as their Fertigkeit—their being ready-made for something—the be-
ing-for of organs entails a Fähigkeit, or a capacity which does not belong 
in the organ as such, but in the system within which the organ is embedded 
(Heidegger 2001). 
Heidegger’s terminological distinction is worth consideration, for it ap-
pears to express the different ontological structure of entities characterized 
by Fertigkeit (that is, instruments as artefactual products), with respect to 
                                                                                                                                                      
a) the stone is worldless; b) the animal is poor in world; and c) man is world-
forming. 
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those characterized by Fähigkeit (that is, the organs of an organism: enti-
ties whose existence depends on their being included in that system of 
connections—an organism—which itself exists only because of the organs 
constituting it). According to Heidegger, the term Fertigkeit points to the 
instrument’s being ready-made for some function—a function that, in order 
to be activated, requires an external subject actually turning it on, so to 
speak. By using such a term, Fertigkeit, and by playing with its connection 
to the adjective fertig—indicating in German the ready-made nature of so-
mething in the sense of its being finite, completed and concluded—
Heidegger underscores the ontological status of artefactual instruments. 
They are precisely products: things whose being depends on a plan, a pro-
cess of construction in which some project is executed, a project that has 
pre-determined the object’s function. Such a function will only become 
concretely active however, when the building plan of the object and the 
process of its production have come to an end, and therefore it must be 
concluded (fertig sein) in order to be at someone’s disposal. 
In this sense, the being-for of the instrument is always subject-oriented, 
and the subject to which it is oriented is structurally distinct from the in-
strument itself. On the contrary, the being-for of an organ is directed to-
wards the system itself, its circular structure is at once the product of the 
reciprocal action of the organs, and the condition of possibility of its being 
as organs. 
9. ORGANS AND INSTRUMENTS AS PARTS OF A SYSTEM 
Therefore organs and instruments relate differently to what their being-for 
is directed at. Organs make their being-for explicit only with respect to an 
environment, which is also the condition of possibility of their being or-
gans, of their being those determinate being(s)-for. At the same time, the 
environment itself (the organism), being the condition of possibility of the 
explication of the organ’s action, has in organs and in their mutual connec-
tions the condition of possibility of its own existence, so much so that it is 
possible to claim that organs are constitutive of the system in which they 
act. Lacking the activity of some of its organs, the system itself undergoes 
changes that can be decisive with respect to its survival.  
There is no such relationship in the connection between an instrument 
and those who use it. There the instrument is, only insofar as someone uses 
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it (a microphone actually is a microphone only insofar as someone uses it 
for the function for which it was built); however, there is no apparent rela-
tionship of reciprocal entailment between an instrument and those who use 
it concerning the respective existences (their enduring being). Thus, whe-
reas an organ has a constitutive function with respect to the subsistence of 
the system in which it is embedded, and the system itself is a condition of 
possibility of the organ, the same thing cannot be claimed of the relation 
between instruments and those who use them. 
In this sense, the being-for underlying the way of being of organs, and 
the being-for underlying the way of being of instruments, reflect different 
ontological structures for these kinds of entities. They are both functionally 
characterized, but in such a shape that the former’s way of being cannot be 
superimposed upon the latter’s.  
10. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PURPOSIVENESS 
Kant separates the being-for of an organ, which depends on a reciprocal re-
lation with the subject to which its being-for is directed (so that its being-
for has a constitutive role with respect to the possibility of the existence of 
that subject), from the being-for of the instrument, which derives from an 
external subject, towards which it plays no constitutive role, via the dis-
tinction between a) internal and b) relative or external purposiveness. 
Kant opens the Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgement with a 
well-known distinction between these two ways of understanding pur-
posiveness, which he discusses in relation to nature: external and internal 
purposiveness or, a relative purposiveness of nature and “an internal pur-
posiveness of the natural being”. 
Relative purposiveness takes place when an entity or a natural event ap-
pears to be oriented towards something else’s utility.6 This is external pur-
posiveness, since the possibility of a goal refers to something else, distinct 
and external with respect to the being to which the purpose is ascribed.7 In 
                                                
6  More precisely, according to Kant, relative purposiveness can be called useful-
ness (Nutzbarkeit) when referred to human beings, and advantageousness 
(Zutraeglichkeit) when referred to any other creature. 
7  “By external purposiveness I mean that in which one thing in nature serves an-
other as the means to an end” [CPJ, 425 (293)]. 
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Kantian terms, purposiveness in this case, is “contingent in the thing itself 
to which it is ascribed” (here Kant refers to natural beings, for example, a 
vegetable providing sustenance to an animal is therefore a target with re-
spect to the subsistence of the animal) [CPJ, 368 (240)]. 
For Kant, such purposiveness (the external kind) cannot perform an ex-
planatory role to aid the scientific consideration of the natural world. On 
the contrary, its clarification allows Kant to part from the anthropocentric 
teleology criticized by Spinoza or Hume, or from cosmic teleology, mak-
ing the kind of progression towards perfection Ernst Mayr describes (Mayr 
1982).8 
Internal purposiveness, to which Kant attributes an explicative capacity 
in our consideration of nature, takes place when a single thing is simulta-
neously “cause and effect of itself” [CPJ, 370 (243)]; when, that is, an ob-
ject’s goal is linked to the nature of the object: what it aims at is nothing 
separated from it, but the realization of what it is. In this case, something’s 
being a goal does not depend on anything else (that is, not on another sepa-
rate, independent entity); it is connected to the thing’s way of being.  
According to Kant, a natural product exists as a natural end (als Natur-
zweck), only “if it is cause and effect of itself”; the products of nature that 
manifest this characteristic, and can therefore be considered as natural 
ends, are living beings. According to Kant, a living being can be both cau-
se and effect of itself in at least three senses: 
 
(a) first, with respect to the species, in the sense that an organism, by pro-
ducing another, “continuously preserves itself, as species” [CPJ, 371 
(243)]: it is, therefore, both a cause and an effect of the survival of the 
species; 
(b) second, with respect to the individual, in the sense of growth 
(Wachstum), that “is to be taken in such a way that it is entirely dis-
                                                
8  It is clear, then, that this distinction is absolutely fundamental for Kant: it is the 
sole means by which the Kantian retrieval of purposiveness apparently escapes 
the general critique of teleology underlying the birth of modern science. The dis-
course on natural purposes is taken to be the by-product of an anthropomorphic 
view of the world, so that the latter is interpreted just as men interpret their prod-
ucts. This criticism strikes at the teleological consideration of nature based upon 
external purposiveness.  
Luca Illetterati 
 149
tinct from any other increase in magnitude in accordance with me-
chanical law [Größenzunahme nach mechanischen Gesetzen]”; instead 
it is a form of generative production or generation (Zeugung) neces-
sary to the development of all organisms (being thus cause of itself) 
“by means of material which, as far as its composition is concerned, is 
its own product” [CPJ, 371 (243)] and therefore, an effect of itself;9 
(c) third, in the sense that the preservation (Erhaltung) of each part “is re-
ciprocally dependent on the preservation of the others” [CPJ, 371 
(243)], so that the parts are essential to the whole, and the whole is es-
sential to the parts: for instance, Kant says that leaves “are certainly 
products of the tree” (therefore, its effects), “yet they preserve it in 
turn” [CPJ, 372 (244)] and are therefore causes.10 
 
Such features—the ways in which organisms’s being manifests both cause 
and effect of themselves—determine the characteristic way of being of liv-
ing things and, consequently, are also the aspects which distinguish the on-
tological structure of natural beings from that of mechanical products as 
conduits for skill. 
In fact, a machine—taken as the paradigmatic technically and artifi-
cially structured and organized product—cannot produce another machine 
via the self-organization of its matter, just as it cannot, by itself, replace its 
own parts or modify its arrangement spontaneously. More importantly: 
whereas a machine can be the instrument for the movement of other like 
                                                
9  “For although as far as the components that it receives from nature outside of it-
self are concerned, it must be regarded as only an educt, nevertheless in the sepa-
ration and new composition of this raw material there is to be found an original-
ity of the capacity for separation and formation [Scheidungs- und Bildungsver-
mögen] in this sort of natural being that remains infinitely remote from all art 
[Kunst] when it attempts to reconstitute such a product of the vegetable kingdom 
from the elements that it obtains by its decomposition or from the material that 
nature provides for its nourishment” [CPJ, 371 (243)]. 
10  This is a very interesting point within Kant’s argument: the capacity of being 
both cause and effect of itself in the last sense is at the basis of the extraordinary 
capacity (owned only by living beings, and distinguishing them even from the 
most complex artefacts) of fixing possible deficiencies via a transformation of 
the functions of single parts in order to preserve the whole organism. This capac-
ity can lead to the development of completely novel forms of life, and also to 
quite odd creatures: see CPJ, 372 (244).  
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machines, but never the efficient cause of their production, each part of an 
organism has to be thought of “as an organ that produces the other parts”, 
so that each part produces the others reciprocally [CPJ, 374 (245)]. In other 
words, whereas in a mechanism “one part is certainly present for the sake 
of the other but not because of it” [CPJ, 374 (246)], in an organism “as an 
organized and self-organized being”, each part can be considered “only 
through all the others” and “for the sake of the others and on account of the 
whole” [CPJ, 373-374 (245)]. The parts of organisms are what they are on-
ly in their relationships with other parts within the whole and, at the same 
time, the whole is what it is only in its connection with the parts.  
11.  THE (UNKNOWABLE) PRINCIPLE OF THE SELF-
ORGANIZATION 
According to Kant, organized products of nature, such as living organisms, 
resist mechanical explanations, not because such explanations cannot clar-
ify how parts and organs work, but because they cannot account for the 
specific connection between the parts and the whole characterizing natural 
beings. Mechanical explanations, despite being—as we shall soon see—the 
only explanations Kant holds as deserving to be called scientific cannot ac-
count for what appears essential and typical in the way of being of natural 
entities: the principle of organization. On the contrary, since the self-
organization of living beings—that ‘formative power’ owned only by 
products organized by nature—is for Kant an ‘inscrutable property’ [CPJ, 
375 (246)], such a structure not only allows, but requires a finalistic prin-
ciple from our cognitive faculties. This justifies those interpretations which 
resort to finalism when they interpret this not as Kant’s attempt to provide 
an autonomous scientific foundation to the science of living being, but evi-
dence of his attitude of “epistemological ‘deflation’” with respect to ‘bio-
medical’ sciences (Zammito, 2006). We should be aware that such a prin-
ciple—the concept of a thing as in itself a natural end—should not be con-
sidered as a constitutive notion of determining judgment: it is only “a 
regulative concept for the reflecting power of judgement”. In other words it 
is a concept employed “for guiding research into objects of this kind” [CPJ 
375 8247)], without aiming to make the intimate constitution of such ob-
jects explicit.  
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12. ORGANISMS AND ARTEFACTS 
In the Critic of the Power of Judgment, Kant uses the difference between 
internal and external purposiveness to sho both the pointlessness scientific 
accounts of nature, of teleological principles based upon external pur-
posiveness (as they occur within the various forms of anthropocentric and 
cosmic teleology), and, the possibility of resorting to a teleology based 
upon intrinsic purposiveness in the consideration of organized products of 
nature, albeit mainly with a regulative and heuristic function. Kant also 
posits a difference between natural and technical products on the grounds 
of how they can be seen as organized structures. Whereas the structure of 
natural beings is self-organized and self-organizing, the organizing princi-
ple of artefacts is always external to the products themselves. Similarly, 
whereas the living product of nature is characterized by a self-realizing ac-
tivity (which is why we are allowed to talk of internal purposiveness), arte-
facts always point at something external, by finding their target (which 
identifies them as what they are) in something different from themselves; 
thus they are characterized by an external purposiveness. 
Such a fundamental difference between the organized products of na-
ture, characterized by self-absorbed processes and activities aiming at their 
own self-subsistence, and technical products whose goal lies outside of 
them, can be made evident via the notion of metabolism, for instance (Jo-
nas 1966). If metabolic process shows only the dependence of an entity on 
a source of energy which allows it to endure through time (thus not mark-
ing a difference between living beings and artefacts), metabolism within 
organisms is not limited to this: it consists in an interdependence between 
the exploitation of energies and their preservation, between the growth, the 
development, and the conservation of the living body. Such interdepend-
ence distinguishes organisms from artefacts, and more specifically, bio-
logical from (so-called) artificial life (Boden 1999). Metabolism allows an 
organism to feed itself by taking the required energy from external sources, 
and consists in the continuous process of restoration of matter within the 
organism itself. In order to endure as a living being, any living being, inde-
pendent of its size and its degree of complexity, must demolish and rebuild 
its constitutive ‘materials’ via metabolic activities of assimilation, trans-
formation and elimination.  
In other words, the way of being of living entities entails their continu-
ous transformation in a self-directed process in which organisms act on 
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themselves—and towards the environment—with the aim of enduring as 
processes, or being what they already are. Therefore the metabolism of 
living beings is not the same as the activity of capturing energy performed 
by a machine. Fuel does make a machine work but metabolism isn’t just 
this. Through metabolism, organisms show themselves more as a system 
which is perpetually the result of the very same process it institutes within 
itself as well as with its surroundings. A living being is the product of a 
process by which organisms ‘build’ themselves, not only by feeding their 
constitutive parts, but also renewing and substituting them by and for 
themselves. 
13. THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE ANALOGIES BETWEEN 
MACHINES AND LIVING BEINGS 
The distinction Kant proposes between internal and external purposive-
ness, ostensibly confounds a superposition between natural and artificial 
products. The being-for of artefacts is always related to an external, inde-
pendent entity, and this displays a logic of the being-for which cannot be 
identified with the one to whom the being-for is directed, as a matter of 
fact, towards the being-for itself. 
For this reason, Kant stresses all the difficulties of comparing living be-
ings and the way of being of artefacts (even analogically), as follows:  
One says far too little about nature and its capacity in organized products if 
one calls this an analogue of art [Analogon der Kunst] [CPJ, 374 (246)].11 
According to Kant, when we compare the way of being of the organized 
products of nature with arts and techniques, we have already transformed 
living beings from self-organizing products into entities related to a de-
signer, a rational being separated from these products, and provided them 
                                                
11  In the initial paragraphs of the Introduction, Kant distinguishes the principle of 
natural purposiveness from that of practical purposiveness, be it the properly 
technical one (‘of human art’, as he claims), or the one related to human action 
(moral). However, in the very same context he acknowledges that even though 
the principle of natural purposiveness cannot be taken as identical to practical 
and technical purposiveness, natural purposiveness is “certainly conceived of in 
terms of an analogy of that” [CPJ, 181 (68)]. 
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with their characteristic internal structure. To think of the organized prod-
ucts of nature as analogous to artefacts would mean to overlook their spe-
cific ontological status, that is, what makes them distinct as self-organizing 
beings which are both cause and effect of themselves, and consequently 
contain their own end. 
We may approach an understanding of this self-structuring, self-
producing capacity of natural beings (which remains largely unknowable) 
by calling it, as Kant does, an analogue of life (Analogon des Lebens). Pro-
bing the consequences of the possible analogy, Kant adds that: 
one must either endow matter as mere matter with a property (hylozoism) that 
contradicts its essence, or else associate with it an alien principle standing in 
communion [in Gemeischaft] with it (a soul) [CPJ, 374-375 (246)]. 
Both ways lead to a dead end: in the first case, we presuppose what we aim 
to explain, that is, organized matter (and this is the contradiction immanent 
in any form of vitalism); in the second case, we take the soul to be the artist 
(Künstlerin) of such a construction, thereby subtracting it from nature.  
Strictly speaking (genau zu reden), Kant claims, “the organization of 
nature is therefore not analogous with any causality that we know” [CPJ, 
375 (246)]. The analogy with art can work insofar as we refer to the ‘aes-
thetical’ consideration of nature, for the beauty of nature is ascribed to ob-
jects “only in relation to reflection on their outer intuition”; but the inner 
natural perfection (innere Naturvollkommenheit) characterizing what Kant 
calls natural ends, which are the organized beings of nature, cannot be re-
duced to any known analogy [CPJ, 375 (247)]. 
14. THE REGULATIVE FUNCTION OF THE NOTION OF 
PURPOSIVENESS IN NATURE 
Kant considers the principle of internal finalism essential to understanding 
the way of being of living beings, yet not constitutive of living beings 
themselves. It is a regulative principle governing our inquiry, that is, guid-
ing and orienting our approach to living beings. Although this principle al-
lows us to speak of living beings’ functions and purposes, it does not allow 
us to ascribe functions and purposes to them, as constitutive of their way of 
being. This is a basic point: the claim, that the self-producing structure of 
living beings—if thoroughly conceptualized—is irreducible to any kind of 
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causality known to us, forces Kant to take the notion of natural purpose as 
merely regulative, never constitutive. 
For Kant, the teleological principle has a regulative and heuristic value 
linked to the reflexive judgment, never a constitutive value linked to the 
determining judgment. However, this holds for the application of the no-
tion of purpose to the natural world. In some contexts, the notion of pur-
pose does have a determining, therefore constitutive, value, with respect to 
knowledge of an object. When we want to understand the cause of the con-
struction of an object, we cannot but consider purposiveness. Moreover, in 
the case of technical products, purposiveness assumes a decisive value. 
Only by beginning from the purposes of the designer can one fully under-
stand the features of her product [FI, 251 (50)]. Technical products arise 
from a project, therefore, from a subject’s intention, and are realized via a 
process of construction which brings to completion the subject’s intention 
and project. In this sense, such intention—the purpose the product has for 
the subject—assumes a constitutive value for the product itself. 
Nevertheless, the fact that purposiveness can have a constitutive value 
with respect to the object to which it is ascribed depends on the fact that 
such purposiveness (an external one) is somehow explicable according to 
one-directional efficient causality. Purposiveness can have a constitutive 
value for artefacts, because of its being explicable according to efficient 
causality via the recognition of the designer’s intention. For Kant, to at-
tribute a constitutive role to purposiveness in nature, necessarily leads to 
the idea of a designer. Such purposiveness derives meaning from the de-
signer, and nature is explained by resorting to something external to it: in 
other words, by recourse to a principle which appears to be transcendent 
with respect to nature. 
According to Kant, then, the impossibility of conceving purposiveness 
without reference to intention provides further justification for the impos-
sibility of attributing any constitutive value whatsoever to natural pur-
posiveness, and thereby for the necessity of taking it only as a maxim of 
the reflexive judgment with no constitutive value with respect to living na-
ture. This is an aspect on which the Critic of the Power of Judgment never 
deflects (Chiereghin 1990). 
To paraphrase, Kant’s point is that despite the fact that organized pro-
ducts of nature exhibit ends and purposes (Kant sometimes claims that the 
purpose is evident in these products), we can never grasp the intention 
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that makes them develop according to that purpose, unless we assume an 
architectonic intellect as given, and if we do so we lose ourselves in the 
transcendent. 
Whereas technical products always presuppose the intentionality of a 
subject constructing and executing the project, purposiveness within na-
ture appears spontaneous, that is lacking the fundamental intentionality 
necessary in order to assign a constitutive role to purposiveness within 
technical causation. Despite the fact that purposes do seem to emerge in 
nature, according to Kant there is no way to prove that such purposes are 
also intentions. If no intention is identified, then we cannot properly talk 
of purposes. 
15. SOME PROBLEMS ARISING THE KANTIAN POSITION 
In this sense, Kant’s position appears to be radically and problematically 
ambiguous. On the one hand, he seems to view the way of being of living 
things as irreducible to that of artefacts: this depends on both the distinc-
tion between internal and external purposiveness, and the idea that organ-
ized products of nature are characterized by an internal purposiveness mak-
ing them inaccessible with respect to a mechanical explicative pattern 
based on efficient causality. On the other hand, Kant only allows a regula-
tive and heuristic reading of the principle of internal purposiveness; there-
fore, only external purposiveness has real explicative significance with re-
spect to the way of being of the object. Such a purposiveness is explicable 
through a linear causal pattern which allows us to speak without problems 
(without falling into the contradiction of the backward causation) of final 
causes with respect to the way of being of the artefatcs. 
Kant’s grounding assumption is that final causality only operates within 
technical and productive activity. This seems to sustain the impossibility of 
attributing a constitutive value to the principle of purposiveness in nature. 
The point is made via the claim that such attribution would somehow entail 
the admission of an architect, or a producer, as the only way to make sense 
of the constitutive value of purposiveness.  
Kant aims to sharply distinguish between the way of being of the organ-
ized products of nature, and that of artefacts. However, this effort flies in 
the face of the fact that, if the fundamental ontological structure of organ-
ized products of nature is given by the notion of purpose, such a concept 
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seems to be only comprehensible within the framework of technical behav-
iour, and therefore, by reference to artefacts.  
It is very likely that the notion of purposiveness in nature is variously 
intermingled, in Kant, with that of technique in nature. Kant allows the no-
tion of technique in nature to surface at various points: generally speaking, 
we may claim that this concept points to the teleological procedure of na-
ture—its proceeding according to purposes, so that, for instance, “we 
would call the procedure (the causality) of nature a technique, on account 
of the similarity to end that we find in its products” [CPJ, 390 (262)]. 
Therefore the technical expression of nature encourages a process “whe-
re objects of nature are sometimes merely judged as if their possibility we-
re grounded in art” [FI, 200 (7)]. Natural beings can be described as if their 
possibility were based upon art, and therefore technique. This allows Kant 
to introduce an interesting distinction—also important for theories devel-
oped in the Twentieth Century—between natural products taken as aggre-
gates, and natural products taken as systems, as Kant calls them. The proc-
ess by which aggregates are formed is purely mechanical, and therefore, it 
is understandable by means of the nexus effectivus. By contrast, systems 
embody processes that cannot be explained in a purely mechanical fashion:  
with regard to its products as aggregates, nature proceeds mechanically, as 
mere nature; but with regard to its products as systems, e.g. crystal 
formations, various shapes of flowers, or the inner structure of plants and 
animals, it proceeds technically, i.e., as at the same time an art [FI, 217 
(20)].12 
This generates the following problems: 
 
                                                
12  The subsequently developed theory to which we refer is the so-called theory of 
systems. It has been built up from its beginnings within biological sciences, espe-
cially in the work of L. von Bertalanffy, despite aiming in its successive devel-
opments at a sort of integration between the methods of natural and social sci-
ences. Now, it is true that one can define a system as a different scientific para-
digm geared to describe the laws of a ‘totality’ in opposition to classical science 
machinery and to one-directional causality (Bertallanfy 1968). However, it is dif-
ficult to avoid seeing a Kantian slant in such definitions, not necessarily entailing 
adherence to the whole Kantian framework. 
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(a) On the one hand, Kantian reflection on the way of being of living be-
ings seems to aim to demonstrate the impossibility of understanding 
life through an explicative framework based upon a mechanical kind 
of causation, the impossibility, therefore, of conceiving the whole of 
nature via a mechanical approach (at least with respect to our cogni-
tive capacities), as one can understand the way of being of a me-
chanical device. 
(b) On the other hand, insofar as Kant conceptualizes the functioning of 
nature within its organized products as a technique in nature, he 
seems to think of it in terms of production: the operational mode in 
which something like a machine, or a technical product, is intelligi-
ble—something to which living beings cannot be reduced.13 
16. BEYOND KANT 
Assuming the concept of purposiveness as an epistemic principle with an 
essentially regulative value with respect to the inquiry of natural science, 
therefore denying it any ontological import, the Kantian position is inher-
ently connected to the supposition, uncritically assumed by Kant himself, 
that the notion of purpose is inseparable from that of intention.  
Apart from this assumption (apart, that is, from the connection between 
purpose and intention), the Kantian description of organized beings of na-
ture, as beings in which each part is reciprocally an instrument and an end, 
describes the way of being of those natural beings that are organized as 
systems whose parts obtain their identity only within causal inter-
connections. In this framework, what plays the cause also plays the (an) ef-
fect: the system’s being structured in parts actually is both cause and effect 
of itself, to use Kantian terminology outside of the regulative meaning he is 
forced to assign it within the presupposed inseparability of purpose and in-
tention.  
                                                
13  The expression ‘technique of nature’ plays a fundamental role in FI; its role is 
drastically reduced in the Introduction Kant published. This might indicate 
Kant’s awareness of the problems faced by the corresponding concept, however, 
the expression remains in the published version and the the plane to which it re-
fers is also manifestly preserved. 
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According to Kant, a real causal connection is made of an always-
descending chain of causes and effects, so that an effect can never be a 
cause of its own cause. Actually, Kant admits that there is a causal pattern 
which, on first assessment, escapes this model, and which entails “both an 
ascending and a descending dependency”, in which, that is, what is re-
ferred to as an effect deserves, by ‘ascending’, to be called a cause of its ef-
fect. This is the causal pattern that can be found in practical and productive 
contexts: specifically, within technical and productive actions, where the 
effect or purpose, produces (that is, causes) the action of what in turn con-
stitutes the cause of that effect. If I build a chair in order to sit on it, what I 
reach at the end of the construction process is the possibility of sitting 
down, but this is also the cause of the process producing it, that is, of its 
own cause. This is not a problem because what comes later, the effect, is 
mentally predicted by the intention of the designer, thereby overcoming the 
various troubles of backward causation. In relation to natural beings, Kant 
claims that there is no question of presupposing a mental prediction of the 
purposes, unless we transcend our cognitive limits. Since this cannot be 
achieved, the ascription of purposes can only be a way for the subject to 
think of the object, but not something constitutive of the object itself. 
Far from showing the ineffectiveness of a constitutive usage of the no-
tion of purpose, this shows how Kant thinks of the purposiveness of natural 
beings by assuming model the kind of purposiveness which is typical of ar-
tefacts and technical products as the basic. Paradoxically he concludes that 
we cannot know the way of being of organized natural beings, which are 
irreducible to the way of being of artefacts, precisely because they are not 
artefacts. 
Suppose, on the contrary, that natural purposiveness is not considered 
following the kind of purposiveness which belongs to artefacts: then that 
pattern of organization which involves a both descending and ascending 
causal series may be taken as typical of all those systems whose constitu-
tive parts can provide some feedback to themselves and to the whole of 
which they are parts, in such a way that the relations among the parts 
within the system, and between the parts and the whole, facilitate talk of 
that system as both cause and effect of itself (McLaughlin 2001). In fact 
we can claim that organ A is self-produced when its activity is related 
backwards to its own subsistence, that is, when the specific activity of that 
organ is a condition of possibility of the subsistence of an organ B, whose 
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activity in turn is a condition of possibility for A. Thus A is not just a cause 
of B as it can subsist only via the action of B.  
In addition, a formally identical causal structure can be found in arte-
facts: productive activity K is not simply the cause of purpose P, for K is 
itself activated by the presence of P. However, the machinery upon which 
such a structure is based differs substantially in the two cases. If, as noted 
above, the causal structure of artefacts is based upon the mental forecast of 
the goal—which brings it back to the simple structure of descending cau-
sality—then the machinery underlying organic structure is a mechanism 
comprising back-and-forth actions which make it irreducible to simple lin-
ear causation.  
This feedback mechanism distinguishes the being-for of artefacts, which 
are always destined to be something different from themselves, and the be-
ing-for of organisms, which are self-contained: the organs that make them 
exist perform their function in such a way as their performance feeds back 
into their future performance in the same system (see Toepfer in this vol-
ume). 
In this sense, if one can assume that what Kant calls external purposive-
ness is the structure capable of explaining the proper function of artefacts, 
since in this case it always depends on the intention of the agent or the u-
ser, then what Kant calls internal purposiveness can be seen as the struc-
ture capable of explaining the functionality of organs within an organism 
(therefore, the way of being of organisms, as distinct from the ontology of 
artefacts). However, internal purposiveness reveals this structure only 
when it is taken as radically distinct from external purposiveness, that is, as 
the being-for of a system whose organs act backwards on their own activ-
ity, thereby allowing other organs to subsist with the whole of which the 
organs are parts.  
17. CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis exposes the difficulties and consequences faced by the 
assumption that the being-for underlying the way of being of artefacts is 
the same as the being-for of such natural beings as the organs of an organ-
ism. Specifically, the way of being of artefacts necessarily entails an exter-
nal, autonomous subject giving sense to the artefact’s being goal-directed; 
it cannot be conflated with the way of being of natural beings, since onto-
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logically speaking the latter is constitutively different from any product 
having its organizational principle outside itself. In this sense, it is possible 
to say that there is a radical difference between the functions and purposes 
of an artefact and those of a living being (or of parts of a living being). 
The proposed Kantian distinction between internal and external pru-
posiveness allows us to determine this difference: external purposiveness 
can be taken as the structure accounting for the being-for of artefacts, and 
yet, internal purposiveness should be assumed to be the structure capable 
of explaining that organized natural systems (living beings) in which the 
relationship between the parts within the whole, and between the parts and 
the whole, is a circular inter-dependence in which all parts—in Kantian 
terms—are simultaneously means and goals with respect to the other parts 
and the whole. 
Finally, it has been shown how the assumption of internal purposiveness 
as a structure accounting for the systematic organization of living beings 
requires us to move beyond Kant’s transcendental framework. Kant’s fra-
mework ties the notion of purpose to that of a designer’s intention (which 
allows for a constitutive role of the notion of purpose with respect to the 
object to which the purpose is ascribed), and thereby reduces internal pur-
posiveness to a mere metaphor (Wouters 2005). Although they are taken as 
radically different from artefacts, living beings are nevertheless considered 
as if they were artefacts or technical products. This makes the specific way 
of being of living beings (which is what makes them irreducible to arte-
facts) unintelligible. 
The thesis that internal purposiveness has to be considered as a specific 
feature of living beings entails the assumption that it is impossible to think 
it on the ground of the model of purposiveness which is typical of artefacts 
and technical products. In other words, such an assumption implies the ne-
cessity of thinking a model of purposiveness without reference to inten-
tions or something like intentions. 
Although thinking of living beings as circular systems, with reciprocally 
inter-dependent parts and parts depending on the whole, requires the over-
coming of the linear causal model underlying technical and productive 
procedures, it implies neither vitalism (which on the contrary can be con-
sidered as a reduction of internal to external purposiveness, so that there 
must be some principle originating the organization of living beings), nor 
assumed alternative causal models. The circular inter-dependence charac-
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terizing such systems does not imply the impossibility of a linear reading 
of causal connections, only an expansion of the concept of cause: such 
connections should be considered within the unitary system as having dif-
ferent directions, depending on whether we want to explain a given process 
within the system, or the relationship between such a process and the total-
ity of the processes constituting the system. 
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